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Abstract 
Much research in social psychology has shown that otherwise helpful people often fail to 
help when bystanders are present. Research in developmental psychology has shown that 
even very young children help, and that others’ presence can actually increase helping in 
some cases. In the current study, in contrast, 5-year-old children helped an experimenter 
at very high levels when they were alone, but significantly less in the presence of 
bystanders who were potentially available to help. In another condition designed to 
elucidate the mechanism underlying the effect, children’s helping was not reduced when 
bystanders were present but confined behind a barrier and thus unable to help (a 
condition that has not been run in previous studies with adults). Young children thus 
show the bystander effect, and it is not due to social referencing or shyness to act in front 
of others, but rather to a sense of a diffusion of responsibility.  
 
Keywords: bystander effect, helping, children, diffusion of responsibility, prosociality, 
developmental psychology 
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Young children show the bystander effect in helping situations 
 
Humans are inordinately helpful. Not only do we help our kin and friends, we 
sometimes even help complete strangers. There are good reasons for this. First, helping 
others increases the chances that the recipient ('direct reciprocity'; Fehr, Gächter, & 
Kirchsteiger, 1997) and others ('indirect reciprocity'; Seinen & Schram, 2006) will help 
us later. Thus helping can enhance our reputations (Milinski, Semmann, & Krambeck, 
2002). Second, helping social partners we are dependent on benefits us in the long run as 
it means that they are more likely to be available as cooperative partners in the future 
('mutualism'; Tomasello, Melis, Tennie, Wyman, & Herrmann, 2012). 
 However, there is a striking finding from social psychology demonstrating that 
sometimes we fail to help, particularly in the presence of others. Darley and Latané 
(1968, 1970; Latané & Darley, 1968) were the first to assess the so-called bystander 
effect experimentally. They found that the presence of other potential helpers decreases 
participants’ likelihood to help. From a game-theoretical perspective, the bystander 
situation has been described as a ‘volunteer’s dilemma’: Since helping is costly, the 
individual likelihood to help approaches zero the more other potential helpers there are 
(Diekmann, 1985). As a psychological explanation for the bystander effect, Darley and 
Latané (1970) suggested a five-step model of intervention in an emergency: An actor has 
to (1) notice the event, (2) interpret it as an emergency, (3) take responsibility, and (4) 
know how to help before he can (5) provide help. They proposed that the presence of 
bystanders interferes with the successful completion of these steps by three processes we 
will refer to as social referencing, diffusion of responsibility, and shyness to act in front 
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of others. Social referencing, or noting the bystanders’ passivity, interferes with step 2, 
diffusion of responsibility interferes with step 3, and a shyness is most likely to interfere 
with step 5 (Darley & Latané, 1970; Fischer et al., 2011; Latané & Nida, 1981). Meta-
analyses show that helping becomes less likely the more bystanders there are, the more 
ambiguous the need for help is, when bystanders remain passive and act unaffected by 
the situation, and when bystanders are strangers (Fischer et al., 2011; Latané & Nida, 
1981). 
 Human prosocial tendencies are deeply rooted in ontogeny. Developmental 
research on helping in children has focused mainly on how helpful young children are 
(Warneken & Tomasello, 2009) rather than on testing the limits to their helpfulness. 
Children start helping others around one year of age (Warneken & Tomasello, 2007), and 
do so in a variety of contexts including instrumental need (Rheingold, 1982; Svetlova, 
Nichols, & Brownell, 2010; Warneken & Tomasello, 2006), sharing (Hay, Castle, 
Davies, Demetriou, & Stimson, 1999), comforting (Svetlova et al., 2010; Zahn-Waxler, 
Radke-Yarrow, Wagner, & Chapman, 1992), and providing useful information 
(Liszkowski, Carpenter, Striano, & Tomasello, 2006). Crucially, young children help 
with no regard for direct rewards or praise (Warneken & Tomasello, 2008) and, 
sometimes, even at a cost to themselves (Warneken, Hare, Melis, Hanus, & Tomasello, 
2007). 
!What little research has been done on how the presence of others can affect 
children’s helping behavior has focused mainly on how others’ presence can increase 
helping:  Five-year-olds are more likely to behave prosocially when someone is watching 
them (Engelmann, Herrmann, & Tomasello, 2012; Leimgruber, Shaw, Santos, & Olson, 
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2012). Thus even young children apparently recognize the reputational advantage of 
helping in some contexts. 
Only one previous study has looked for the bystander effect in children. Staub 
(1970) had participants who were either alone or in pairs overhear a child in another 
room fall from a chair. Staub did not find a bystander effect until children reached the age 
of 9. In fact, children from 5 years showed the opposite pattern of results: They helped 
more when in pairs than when alone. However there is other evidence from naturalistic 
observations and interviews in daycare and school settings suggesting that young children 
may show the bystander effect in some contexts. These studies find that children seldom 
help or feel responsible for helping when witnessing a peer in distress (Caplan & Hay, 
1989; Thornberg, 2007) or during bullying incidents (e.g., Craig & Pepler, 1997; 
Salmivalli, Lappalainen, & Lagerspetz, 1998). Although in these naturalistic settings 
there were usually bystanders present, none of the studies manipulated the presence of 
bystanders systematically. We thus do not know whether children’s reluctance to help in 
these studies was due to bystander presence. The important question of whether young 
children take responsibility into account when deciding whether to help has also not yet 
been experimentally investigated. 
In this study, we therefore investigated whether young children’s tendency to help 
can be reduced by the presence of bystanders. Five-year-olds witnessed an experimenter 
who needed help when they were either alone (Alone condition) or in the presence of two 
peer (confederate) bystanders who did not help (Bystander condition), and we measured 
whether they helped the experimenter. An additional aim was to investigate the main 
processes underlying the bystander effect, assuming we observed it (i.e., shyness to act in 
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front of others, social referencing, or diffusion of responsibility). We thus included a third 
condition (that is new to the bystander literature in general) in which the bystanders were 
positioned behind a low barrier, visible for the participant and watching the situation, but 
unable to help (Bystander-unavailable condition). This condition matched the Bystander 
condition in that bystanders were present and could observe the situation, thus controlling 
for shyness to act. Furthermore, participants had the opportunity to socially reference the 
bystanders’ passivity in both conditions. The only difference between the Bystander and 
the Bystander-unavailable condition was whether the bystanders were available, and 
therefore potentially responsible, to help. Thus this condition tested whether any 
bystander effect we found was driven by diffusion of responsibility.  
We tested 5-year-olds because whereas previous studies found that the presence 
of others increased, rather than decreased, helping in 5-year-olds, there are 
methodological factors that might explain this (see below). If instead we found decreased 
helping in the presence of bystanders, this would provide an important contrast to those 
studies, and a much richer picture of the complexity of young children’s helping 
behavior. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were sixty 5-year-olds (mean age: 5 years, 7 months; age range: 5 
years, 0 months – 5 years, 11 months). The sample size was specified prior to data 
collection, based on typical sample sizes in this field. Half of the participants in each 
condition were female. Children were recruited from a database of parents who had 
agreed to participate in studies on child development. Children were randomly assigned 
to one of the three conditions. A total of 12 peer confederates (mean age: 5 years, 10 
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months; age range: 4 years, 11 months – 6 years, 11 months) were assigned to mixed-sex 
dyads on the basis of availability to participate in testing and their reliability as 
confederates. These children were bystanders in the Bystander and the Bystander-
unavailable conditions and were always strangers to the participant. 
Four additional children were invited but not tested because they refused to 
participate. An additional 14 participants were tested but excluded from analyses for 
video camera error (1), experimenter error (3), or confederate error (10). Confederate 
error was coded if confederates deviated from their instructions in significant ways: if 
they gave hints to the participants that they knew what was going to happen next (3/10), 
if they revealed that they had participated before (4/10), if the participants noticed them 
looking towards them on more than two occasions during the test phase (1/10), or if they 
talked excessively (2/10). Inter-rater reliability on the decision to exclude participants due 
to confederate error was assessed on a random selection of 12 cases (including 6 out of 
the 10 confederate drop outs) by a coder who was naïve to the hypotheses of the study (κ 
= 0.83). The few disagreements were resolved by discussion. 
Set-up and materials  
 Testing was conducted in a room containing four child-size tables and chairs, one 
for E and three for the participant and two bystanders. Children’s tables stood next to 
each other (at a distance of 130 cm) in the back of the room facing the experimenter’s 
table, and were separated by 135 x 80 cm barriers (which were opaque up to a height of 
70 cm, i.e., approximately shoulder height of the children while seated). From the 
participant’s sitting position, both bystanders were equally visible in the Bystander and 
the Bystander-unavailable condition (see Figure 1). There was a pile of paper towels on 
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the floor between children’s tables and the experimenter’s table (175 cm equidistant from 
each of the children’s tables). Other materials were a set of 10 different pictures for 
coloring, color pencils, a 300 x 80 cm cardboard wall, a cup of green paint, and a cup 
containing colored water and paintbrushes. 
 
Fig. 1. 
Re-enactment of the set-up in (a) the Alone condition, (b) the Bystander condition, and 
(c) the Bystander-unavailable condition. The participant is seated on the left in each 
picture.  
Procedure 
 Introduction. Participants were told that they were going to color a picture. In the 
Alone condition, participants were led to the testing room, where they were asked to 
choose a picture to color. In the Bystander and Bystander-unavailable condition, 
participants met the two confederates in front of the testing room. They were introduced 
by name and said to be participating as well. All children and the experimenter then 
entered the testing room and chose a picture. Participants always were asked (seemingly 
randomly) to choose first and then the confederates always each chose different pictures. 
 Introductory phase. In all conditions, the experimenter then noticed a puddle of 
water in the middle of the room which she wiped up with some paper towels. She put the 
leftover paper towels on the floor, saying “…in case something needs to be wiped up 
later.”  
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Manipulation phase.  Children were asked to sit down to color. The 
experimenter then said that while children colored their pictures, she would paint her 
cardboard wall and to do that more easily, she would place it in a certain way. In the 
Bystander condition, she put the wall to the side (against the right wall in Figure 1b). In 
the Bystander-unavailable condition, she attached the wall to the barriers separating 
children’s tables, such that the two confederates were fenced in and unable to leave their 
compartments. In this condition, the experimenter then commented on the wall with 
apparent surprise, saying, “Oh, I’ve just realized, now you two can’t get out of here. 
Well, you are fenced in now briefly, but don’t worry, you can get out as soon as we’re 
finished here.” In the Alone condition, the wall was put to the side (as in the Bystander 
condition) for half of the children, and attached to the barriers (as in the Bystander-
unavailable condition) for the other half. In all conditions the participants were able to 
move freely. After this, all children were given pencils and were asked to start coloring, 
while the experimenter painted her cardboard wall. After approximately a minute, the 
experimenter then said she needed to clean her paintbrushes and sat down at her table 
with the cup of water and the paintbrushes. 
 Test phase. After approximately half a minute, E ‘accidentally’ knocked over the 
cup and spilled colored water all over her table. She tried to hold back the water with her 
forearms to prevent it from spilling onto the floor. During the first 15 seconds after 
spilling the water, E said, while looking down at the water, “Oops,” and groaned. She 
repeated this two more times. After those 15 seconds, if participants had not yet helped, 
she said, “My cup has fallen over.” After 30 seconds, E said, “The water is about to drip 
onto the floor.” After 45 seconds, she said, “I need something to wipe it up,” while 
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looking back and forth between the water and the paper towels on the floor. After 60 
seconds, she said, “I need the paper towels there,” looking at the paper towels, out of her 
reach. She then looked for the first time at the children, starting with the participant on 
the left and then moving her gaze to the right to each of the bystanders and back to the 
left, and did so twice. By doing that, she looked at the participant and the bystanders in 
the two Bystander conditions, and at the participant and the two empty tables in the 
Alone condition. After 75 seconds, she said, “Could somebody give me the paper towels 
there” looking at the children again as described above. After 90 seconds, if the 
participant still had not brought her some paper towels, she appeared to realize that there 
were paper towels behind her that she could reach easily and so cleaned up the water 
herself. 
Confederates had been instructed to be friendly throughout the study, but not talk, 
and especially to give no hints that they were confederates of the experimenter, that they 
had participated in the study before, or about what would happen later. In the test phase, 
they were instructed to look at the experimenter neutrally from time to time but to 
continue drawing, and not look at the participant. Coding and analyses of confederates’ 
behavior to check that their behavior was equivalent in the two Bystander conditions can 
be found in the Supplemental Material available online. Confederates were told that this 
was just play-acting for the sake of the study, and normally one should help in these 
situations. 
 Interview. We also interviewed participants after the main test phase was 
complete. This interview was based on the 5-step model of Darley and Latané (1970). An 
assistant that participants had interacted with briefly prior to the experiment interviewed 
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them alone. She expressed her regret that she had missed children’s drawing session and, 
to measure whether children noticed the accident, she asked (1) what had happened and 
in particular whether there was anything that happened to the experimenter. To measure 
whether children understood that the experimenter needed help, she asked (2) whether the 
experimenter really needed help in the situation. To measure whom children thought was 
responsible for helping, she asked (3) whose job it was to help in the situation, and how 
participants knew who should help. To measure whether children knew appropriate 
means for helping, she asked (4) if participants knew how to help the experimenter, and 
finally, as a manipulation check (MC) to see whether the cardboard wall was a 
convincing barrier for participants in the Bystander-unavailable condition, she asked if 
anybody else could have helped in the situation.  
 At the very end of the test session, after the interview, the assistant emphasized to 
participants who had helped that it was good to help, and to participants who had not 
helped that generally helping is good, but it was probably OK not to help here as E was 
able to help herself eventually. Participants in the Bystander condition were told that 
probably the bystanders had not helped because they had not noticed that E needed help. 
Coding and Reliability 
Coding of helping. For the helping situation, the main measure was whether 
participants did or did not help the experimenter by bringing her at least one paper towel 
within the 90-second response phase. In addition, we also coded how quickly participants 
helped. This was coded on a 7-point scale indicating the phase in which children helped 
(phases corresponded to each 15-second step described above, during which the 
experimenter made her need for help increasingly more explicit). Children scored 1 if 
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they helped spontaneously in the first part of the test phase, 2, if they helped in the 
second part of the test phase and so on up to the sixth and final part of the test phase; if 
they did not help they were not included in these analyses.  
Coding of social referencing. For the Bystander and Bystander-unavailable 
conditions, we also took a measure of social referencing, coding how often participants 
looked towards the bystanders. The number of looks was divided by the helping phase to 
correct for the time it took children to help. This resulted in a mean number of looks per 
helping phase for each child.  
Coding of the interview. For the interview responses we coded for question (1) 
whether participants mentioned the water spilling incident or not, for question (2) “E 
needed help” versus “E did not need help”, for question (3) when asked who had the job 
to help, whether children said “me” (versus “everybody”, “nobody”, or other), and when 
asked how they knew who should help, whether children said “because I had to do it” 
(versus “everybody could do it”, “nobody could do it”, or other), for question (4) “I knew 
how to help” versus “I did not know how to help”, and for the (MC) question whether 
children mentioned the cardboard wall as a reason why nobody else could have helped.   
Reliability. Videos of the helping situation and the interview were coded by the 
first author. Reliability coding by a naïve coder who was unaware of the hypotheses of 
the study on the full sample revealed perfect agreement on whether or not children helped 
(κ = 1) and the phase in which children helped (rs = 1, with no difference between coders, 
Mann-Whitney U-Test: p = 1), and excellent agreement on the number of times 
participants looked towards the bystanders (r = 0.95, with no difference between coders, 
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Mann-Whitney U-Test: p = .65) and the interview responses (all κ’s > 0.82). 
Disagreements were resolved by discussion. 
Results 
Helping 
 Preliminary analysis revealed that gender did not have an effect on the overall 
number of participants who helped (Fisher’s exact test, p = .51), so we collapsed across 
gender in the following analyses. The number of participants who helped E was 
significantly different across the three conditions (Fisher’s exact test, p = .001, Cramer’s 
Φ = 0.487; see Figure 2). Whereas the number of children who helped in the Alone and 
Bystander-unavailable conditions was identical, children were less likely to help in the 
Bystander condition. A post-hoc comparison revealed that the Bystander condition 
differed significantly from the other two conditions (Fisher’s exact tests, Bystander – 
Alone: p = .008; Φ= 0.404; Bystander – Bystander-unavailable: p = .008; Φ = 0.404; 
Alone – Bystander-unavailable: p = 1; Φ = 0).  
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Fig. 2. 
Percentage of participants who helped and did not help the experimenter in each 
condition (N=60). 
 
Latency to help 
Considering only those children who had helped E, an analysis of how quickly 
children helped (i.e., in which helping phase they helped) indicated a significant 
difference between conditions (Kruskal-Wallis H-test: X²(2) = 6.50, p = .039). Children 
helped significantly earlier in the Alone condition (Mdn = 4, range = 1-6) than in the 
Bystander (Mdn = 5, range = 1-6, Mann-Whitney U(n1=19, n2=11) = 54.5, p = .027, r = -
0.40) and the Bystander-unavailable condition (Mdn = 5, range = 1-6, Mann-Whitney 
U(n1=n2=19) = 109.5, p = .034, r = -0.35). There was no difference between the 
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Bystander and Bystander-unavailable conditions (Mann-Whitney U(n1=11, n2=19) = 106, 
p = 0.97, r = 0.07). One possible explanation for this pattern of results is that the situation 
was more complex in the two bystander situations and, as a consequence, it took children 
longer to process. Table S1 in the Supplemental Material available online provides a 
more detailed depiction of the latencies to help in each phase in each condition. 
Social referencing 
 The mean number of looks to the bystanders per helping phase did not differ 
between the Bystander (Mdn: 0.29, range: 0 to 0.86) and the Bystander-unavailable 
condition (Mdn = 0.33, range = 0 to 1; Mann-Whitney U(n1=n2=20) = 180.5, p = .61, r = 
-0.08). The behavior of the confederates during the test phase in the Bystander and the 
Bystander-unavailable condition were comparable (see Supplemental Materials for 
details). 
Interview 
 (1) Noticing the event. All participants noticed the event and were able to 
describe what had happened to the experimenter in all three conditions.  
 (2) Interpreting the need for help. The majority of children in all conditions 
judged that the experimenter really needed help, with no difference across conditions 
(Alone condition: 94.1%, Bystander condition: 73.7%, Bystander-unavailable condition: 
94.4%, Fisher’s exact test, p = .19, Φ= 0.293).  
 (3) Responsibility to help. For the first question, 52.5% of children in both the 
Alone condition and the Bystander-unavailable condition said that it was their job to 
help, whereas only 11.8% said this in the Bystander condition (Fisher’s exact test, p = 
.015, Φ= 0.385; post-hoc Fisher’s exact tests: Bystander – Alone: p = .014, Φ = 0.374; 
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Bystander – Bystander-unavailable: p = .014, Φ = 0.374; Alone – Bystander-unavailable: 
p = 1, Φ = 0). For the second question, 52.9% of children in the Alone condition and 
57.9% of children in the Bystander-unavailable condition said they knew who should 
help because they were the ones who had to do it, whereas only 5.3% said this in the 
Bystander condition (Fisher’s exact test, p < .001, Φ = 0.494; post-hoc Fisher’s exact 
tests: Bystander – Alone: p = .002, Φ = 0.469; Bystander – Bystander-unavailable: p = 
.001, Φ = 0.51; Alone – Bystander-unavailable: p = 1, Φ = 0).  
 (4) Knowledge of how to help. In the Bystander condition, 47.4% of children 
said that they had not known how to help the experimenter, in contrast to 10% in the 
Alone condition and 0% in the Bystander-unavailable condition (Fisher’s exact test, p < 
.001, Φ = 0.519; post-hoc Fisher’s exact tests: Bystander – Alone: p = .014, Φ = 0.358; 
Bystander – Bystander-unavailable: p < .001, Φ = 0.501; Alone – Bystander-unavailable: 
p = .487, Φ = 0.115). It was mainly the children who did not help in the Bystander 
condition who said this (i.e., 88.9% of children who did not help said “I did not know”, 
whereas only 10% of children who did help said “I did not know”). 
Manipulation check. The manipulation check question revealed that the 
cardboard wall was a convincing barrier for the majority of participants in the Bystander-
unavailable condition, with 80% of them explicitly naming this as the reason why the 
bystanders could not have helped. 
Discussion 
Young children showed the bystander effect: Five-year-olds were less likely to 
help someone in need when bystanders were present than when alone. Our control 
condition explained why. When bystanders were present but confined behind a barrier 
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and therefore unavailable to help, children helped just as often as they did when they 
were alone. Thus it was not simply the mere presence of bystanders that caused the effect 
(e.g., through shyness to act in front of others). Nor was it social referencing of the 
bystanders’ passivity, as participants looked towards the bystanders equally often 
irrespective of their availability to help, and the bystanders’ behavior was comparable in 
the two conditions (see Supplemental Material). Rather, it appears that the effect was 
driven by the diffusion of responsibility existing only in the Bystander condition. 
Children apparently recognized that they alone were responsible to help in the Alone and 
Bystander-unavailable conditions, whereas in the Bystander condition, responsibility was 
diffused among three potential helpers. This conclusion is supported by the interview, 
where children were more likely to report it was their job to help in the Alone and 
Bystander-unavailable conditions than in the Bystander condition. Children at this age 
therefore take responsibility into account when deciding whether to help. 
 It is interesting to consider why we found a bystander effect whereas three other 
studies have shown increased helping in the presence of others at this age (Engelmann et 
al., 2012; Leimgruber et al., 2012; Staub, 1970). The differences in results can be 
explained by differences in methods. Staub’s study featured characteristics that meta-
analyses have shown to reduce bystander effects (e.g., bystanders were not strangers, the 
situation was dangerous rather than ambiguous; Fischer et al., 2011; Latané & Nida, 
1981). Furthermore, participants might not have felt competent to help the injured victim, 
and thus the presence of a peer might have reduced participants’ discomfort or 
helplessness and therefore facilitated helping (Latané & Nida, 1981). In the other two 
studies, the observers were onlookers, rather than bystanders, because they were only 
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watching and did not have the means to help (Engelmann et al., 2012), or they were the 
recipients themselves (Leimgruber et al., 2012). Thus, as in our Bystander-unavailable 
condition, responsibility in those studies was clearly attributable to participants since they 
were the only ones able to help.  
An outstanding (and related) question is why the Bystander-unavailable condition 
did not lead to enhanced helping due to participants’ reputational concerns, as in this 
condition the bystanders could potentially hold the participant accountable for failing to 
help. This would link with findings in the adult literature that the presence of 
accountability cues can enhance helping (van Bommel, van Prooijen, Elffers, & van 
Lange, 2012, 2014). The current study was not designed to investigate reputation effects 
on helping behavior directly, and the fact that children helped almost at ceiling in both 
the Alone and the Bystander-unavailable conditions makes it difficult to determine 
whether reputational effects might have increased helping in the Bystander-unavailable 
condition. !It is worth noting, however, that children helped more slowly in the 
Bystander-unavailable condition than in the Alone condition, suggesting that it was not 
the case that they were more motivated to help in the Bystander-unavailable condition. 
The relationship between bystander effects and reputation is an interesting question for 
future research, as factors that could lead to a promotion of helping have often been 
neglected in the bystander literature (Levine & Cassidy, 2010; Levine & Crowther, 
2008). 
One interesting finding from the interview results is that almost half the children 
in the Bystander condition (mainly those who had not helped during the test) said they 
had not known how to help. This is actually unlikely to be the case, because E 
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demonstrated how to use the paper towels before the test and directly asked for paper 
towels during the response phase. It could be that those children who had not helped gave 
post-hoc rationalizations for not helping, potentially to save face, or to make themselves 
feel better about not helping. 
It would be interesting to know whether a similar effect is seen in even younger 
children. However, practically speaking, the current method would not work with 
younger children because of the demands of the confederates’ roles. Piloting revealed 
that 5 years is the youngest age at which children have the necessary inhibition and acting 
skills to be reliable confederates. Since it is important to use similar-age peers as 
bystanders, because older bystanders might be expected to be more competent to help, 
this limits the use of this method to children of at least 5 years. An appropriate method 
for testing younger children still needs to be developed. 
 This study contributes to the helping literature by showing that although children 
are typically extremely helpful (Warneken & Tomasello, 2009), this tendency to help can 
be overridden in certain circumstances: Five-year-olds help at very high levels only when 
responsibility is clearly attributable to them. They are less likely to help when the 
presence of other potential helpers causes a diffusion of responsibility.  
 Humans are inordinately helpful, and there are good reasons for this. Yet the 
potential benefits of being helpful are not always sufficient to outweigh the costs 
associated with it. When others are available, we often wait for them to help. Here we 
show that young children do this as well. The findings that in some circumstances 
children help more and in some circumstances help less when others are present 
illustrates the complexity of young children’s helping behavior. These results also have 
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practical applications. They suggest that interventions to promote helpfulness in 
bystander-type situations should address the issue of diffusion of responsibility early in 
development.   
YOUNG CHILDREN SHOW THE BYSTANDER EFFECT 
 
21 
Author contributions 
 All authors contributed to the idea of the study and the design. Testing and data 
collection were performed by M. Plötner. M. Plötner performed the data analysis and 
interpretation under the supervision of H. Over, M. Carpenter, and M. Tomasello. M. 
Plötner drafted the manuscript, and H. Over, M. Carpenter, and M. Tomasello provided 
critical revisions. All authors approved the final version of the manuscript for submission. 
  
YOUNG CHILDREN SHOW THE BYSTANDER EFFECT 
 
22 
Acknowledgments 
 We thank the ESRC for supporting Harriet Over (grant number ES/K006702/1), 
Robert Hepach for contributing to the study design, and Jana Jurkat, Lydia Fiedler, 
Christian Biermann, Alex Call and the confederates for their help with data collection. 
  
YOUNG CHILDREN SHOW THE BYSTANDER EFFECT 
 
23 
References 
Caplan, M. Z., & Hay, D. F. (1989). Preschoolers’ responses to peers’ distress and beliefs 
about bystander intervention. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry and 
Allied Disciplines, 30(2), 231-242. doi: 10.1111/j.1469-7610.1989.tb00237.x 
Craig, W. M., & Pepler, D. J. (1997). Observations of bullying and victimization in the 
school yard. Canadian Journal of School Psychology, 13(2), 41-59. doi: 
10.1177/082957359801300205 
Darley, J. M., & Latané, B. (1968). Bystander intervention in emergencies: Diffusion of 
responsibility. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 8, 377-383. doi: 
10.1037/H0025589 
Darley, J. M., & Latané, B. (1970). The unresponsive bystander: Why doesn't he help? 
New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts. 
Diekmann, A. (1985). Volunteers dilemma. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 29(4), 605-
610. doi: 10.1177/0022002785029004003 
Engelmann, J. M., Herrmann, E., & Tomasello, M. (2012). Five-year olds, but not 
chimpanzees, attempt to manage their reputations. PLoS ONE, 7. doi: 
10.1371/journal.pone.0048433   
Fehr, E., Gächter, S., & Kirchsteiger, G. (1997). Reciprocity as a contract enforcement 
device: Experimental evidence. Econometrica, 65(4), 833-860. doi: 
10.2307/2171941 
Fischer, P., Krueger, J. I., Greitemeyer, T., Vogrincic, C., Kastenmuller, A., Frey, D., . . . 
Kainbacher, M. (2011). The bystander-effect: A meta-analytic review on 
bystander intervention in dangerous and non-dangerous emergencies. 
Psychological Bulletin, 137(4), 517-537. doi: 10.1037/A0023304 
YOUNG CHILDREN SHOW THE BYSTANDER EFFECT 
 
24 
Hay, D. F., Castle, J., Davies, L., Demetriou, H., & Stimson, C. A. (1999). Prosocial 
action in very early childhood. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 
40(6), 905-916. doi: 10.1111/1469-7610.00508 
Latané, B., & Darley, J. M. (1968). Group inhibition of bystander intervention in 
emergencies. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 10(3), 215-221. doi: 
10.1037/H0026570 
Latané, B., & Nida, S. (1981). 10 years of research on group-size and helping. 
Psychological Bulletin, 89(2), 308-324. doi: 10.1037//0033-2909.89.2.308 
Leimgruber, K. L., Shaw, A., Santos, L. R., & Olson, K. R. (2012). Young children are 
more generous when others are aware of their actions. Plos One, 7(10). doi: 
10.1371/journal.pone.0048292 
Liszkowski, U., Carpenter, M., Striano, T., & Tomasello, M. (2006). 12-and 18-month-
olds point to provide information for others. Journal of Cognition and 
Development, 7(2), 173-187. doi: 10.1207/s15327647jcd0702_2 
Milinski, M., Semmann, D., & Krambeck, H. J. (2002). Donors to charity gain in both 
indirect reciprocity and political reputation. Proceedings of the Royal Society B-
Biological Sciences, 269(1494), 881-883. doi: 10.1098/rspb.2002.1964  
Rheingold, H. L. (1982). Little children's participation in the work of adults, a nascent 
prosocial behavior. Child Development, 53(1), 114-125. doi: 10.2307/1129643 
Salmivalli, C., Lappalainen, M., & Lagerspetz, K. M. (1998). Stability and change of 
behavior in connection with bullying in schools: A two!year follow!up. 
Aggressive behavior, 24(3), 205-218. doi: 10.1002/(SICI)1098-
2337(1998)24:3<205::AID-AB5>3.0.CO;2-J 
YOUNG CHILDREN SHOW THE BYSTANDER EFFECT 
 
25 
Seinen, I., & Schram, A. (2006). Social status and group norms: Indirect reciprocity in a 
repeated helping experiment. European Economic Review, 50(3), 581-602. doi: 
10.1016/j.euroecorev.2004.10.005 
Staub, E. (1970). A child in distress: The influence of age and number of witnesses on 
children's attempts to help. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 14(2), 
130-140. doi: 10.1037/h0028752 
Svetlova, M., Nichols, S. R., & Brownell, C. A. (2010). Toddlers' prosocial behavior: 
From instrumental to empathic to altruistic helping. Child Development, 81(6), 
1814-1827. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8624.2010.01512.x 
Thornberg, R. (2007). A classmate in distress: Schoolchildren as bystanders and their 
reasons for how they act. Social Psychology of Education, 10(1), 5-28. doi: 
10.1007/s11218-006-9009-4 
Tomasello, M., Melis, A. P., Tennie, C., Wyman, E., & Herrmann, E. (2012). Two key 
steps in the evolution of human cooperation. Current Anthropology, 53(6), 673-
692. doi: 10.1086/668207 
van Bommel, M., van Prooijen, J.-W., Elffers, H., & van Lange, P. A. (2012). Be aware 
to care: Public self-awareness leads to a reversal of the bystander effect. Journal 
of Experimental Social Psychology, 48(4), 926-930. doi: 
10.1016/j.jesp.2012.02.011 
van Bommel, M., van Prooijen, J.-W., Elffers, H., & van Lange, P. A. (2014). Intervene 
to be Seen The Power of a Camera in Attenuating the Bystander Effect. Social 
Psychological and Personality Science, 5(4), 459-466. doi: 
10.1177/1948550613507958 
YOUNG CHILDREN SHOW THE BYSTANDER EFFECT 
 
26 
Warneken, F., Hare, B., Melis, A. P., Hanus, D., & Tomasello, M. (2007). Spontaneous 
altruism by chimpanzees and young children. Plos Biology, 5(7), 1414-1420. doi: 
10.1371/journal.pbio.0050184 
Warneken, F., & Tomasello, M. (2006). Altruistic helping in human infants and young 
chimpanzees. Science, 311(5765), 1301-1303. doi: 10.1126/science.1121448 
16513986 
Warneken, F., & Tomasello, M. (2007). Helping and cooperation at 14 months of age. 
Infancy, 11(3), 271-294. doi: 10.1080/15250000701310389 
Warneken, F., & Tomasello, M. (2008). Extrinsic rewards undermine altruistic tendencies 
in 20-month-olds. Developmental Psychology, 44(6), 1785. doi: 
10.1037/a0013860 18999339 
Warneken, F., & Tomasello, M. (2009). The roots of human altruism. British Journal of 
Psychology, 100(3), 455-471. doi: 10.1348/000712608X379061 
Zahn-Waxler, C., Radke-Yarrow, M., Wagner, E., & Chapman, M. (1992). Development 
of concern for others. Developmental Psychology, 28(1), 126. doi: 10.1037/0012-
1649.28.1.126!
